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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the connection between network centrality and firm growth on a sample of 3224 financial services
firms located in the UK in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The findings, based on a spatial econometric model of
long-term firm growth, indicate that firms that span structural holes, engage in co-management appointments and have
network connections to related companies in other financial centres grow faster. In contrast, such connections generate
substantial negative indirect effects on proximate firms, leading to a divergence of growth rates between globally
connected and locally embedded firms.
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INTRODUCTION
The aftermath of the global financial crisis has seen a sharp
reduction in employment in financial services in the UK,1
shrinking bank balance sheets2 and a reduction in global
investment banking revenue3 (Wójcik & MacDonald-
Korth, 2015; Wójcik, Knight, O’Neill, & Pažitka, 2018a).
Underneath this grim veil, however, there was a lot of vari-
ation in the effects of the global financial crisis on individual
financial centres (FCs) and even more so on individual firms.
There is a highly unequal urban hierarchy of FCs in the
UK, with substantial functional differences between differ-
ent FCs (Parr & Budd, 2000). While London hosts most
of the big banks and offers a wide range of complementary
products, the remainder of the FCs in the UK, with Edin-
burgh in the lead, offer only a fraction of the capabilities of
London (Clark, 2002; Cook, Pandit, Beaverstock, Taylor,
& Pain, 2007; Parr & Budd, 2000). Consequently, differ-
ent FCs and firms performed very differently in the post-
global financial crisis period. The implications of these
processes are far reaching and extend beyond the financial
sector owing to the interconnectedness between financial
services and the real economy (Coe, Lai, & Wójcik,
2014; Wójcik, 2018).
The financial geography literature offers several contri-
butions assessing the effect of the global financial crisis on
financial services; however, a substantial gap remains regard-
ing the variation in growth performance of firms (Wójcik &
MacDonald-Korth, 2015). Coe et al. (2014) and Wójcik
(2018) develop the global financial networks (GFNs) frame-
work, which has networks formed by the activities of finan-
cial and business services (FABS) firms at its heart. This
literature is, however, yet to produce empirical studies of
GFNs. Pandit, Cook, and Swann (2001) study the effect
of clustering on firm growth; however, their study predates
the global financial crisis and it does not consider the role
of network connections. A substantial literature focusing
on firm growth exists in economics (Evans, 1987; Macpher-
son & Holt, 2007); however, it does not consider potential
interactions among co-located firms or the role of networks.
Complementing this work with the research on financial
networks (Arjaliès, Grant, Hardie, MacKenzie, & Svetlova,
2017; Clark &Monk, 2017; Pichler &Wilhelm, 2001; Pol-
lock, Porac, & Wade, 2004; Wójcik, 2018) leads to a
research design that puts the positioning of individual
firms in financial networks at the forefront of explaining
their long-run growth performance and allows for inter-
actions among co-located firms.
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The objective of this paper is to study the effect of
network centrality of financial services firms within
syndication networks4 on their long-term growth rate
and the indirect effects on other co-located firms. Owing
to the relationship-oriented nature of investment banking,
the primary subsector of financial services considered here,
individual firms rely on their network capital to access
valuable business opportunities, to develop relationships
with new clients and to remain competitive. Consequently,
it is likely that positioning within syndication networks has
important consequences for long-term growth of financial
services firms. To explore this proposition, we focus on
the following two research questions:
. Do financial services firms with more central positioning
within syndication networks grow faster?
. How are financial services firms located within the
proximity of well-connected firms affected?
We use a sample of 3224 financial services firms
sourced from the Bureau van Dijk’s Financial Analysis
Made Easy (FAME) database and estimate a series of
spatial econometric models of their average annual growth
rates in the period 2007–15. We construct several specifi-
cations of network centrality, including degree centrality,
betweenness centrality and network constraint (Burt,
2004). We use data on syndicated capital market deals,5
supplied by Dealogic, to operationalize the measures of
network centrality. The results indicate that firms with
higher network centrality grow faster, ceteris paribus. This
effect holds for network centrality measures based on the
number of network connections, brokerage as well as the
size of FCs to which they are connected. Network central-
ity, however, leads to a divergence of growth rates between
central and peripheral firms. This suggests that any benefits
associated with networking primarily benefit focal firms
and in turn lead to increased competitive pressure and
lower growth prospects for other proximate firms. Conse-
quently, we interpret these connections as a source of com-
petitive advantage for the focal firm.
The paper is structured as follows. The literature and
hypotheses section reviews the relevant literature on the
topic and develops four hypotheses. The research design
section details the econometric modelling methodology
and data set used. We then present the results and com-
ment on the validity of the tested hypotheses. We draw
conclusions, discuss the limitations of this study and
make recommendations for public policy and corporate
strategy in the final section.
LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES
Research on clusters can be traced at least as far back as the
work of Marshall (1920), and the trinity of original prop-
ositions for clustering still bears relevance.The cross-fertiliza-
tion between the fields of economic geography and industrial
dynamics has led to a rich literature on the dynamics of clus-
tering, which can be divided into two themes: (1) the effect of
clustering on firm entry, growth and survival; and (2)
evolution of clusters. This literature draws on studies of
firm growth in economics (Evans, 1987; Macpherson &
Holt, 2007) and incorporates measures of clustering in
models of firm growth (Frenken, Cefis, & Stam, 2015). Pre-
sently, however, it lacks studies that empirically disentangle
the different types of localized inter-firm interactions and
explicitly consider relational ties of firms.
Financial and economic geographers have contributed
to these debates by studying the effects of clustering on
firm growth (Beaudry & Swann, 2009; Pandit et al.,
2001), while contributions from financial economics and
business studies expand this work by considering network
connectivity (Ljungqvist, Marston, &Wilhelm, 2009; Shi-
pilov, 2006). Geographers studying FABS have long been
interested in the problem of clustering of firms in urban
areas (Cook et al., 2007) as well as the networks formed
by FABS that connect cities (Taylor & Derudder, 2016;
Wójcik, 2018). While the former studies are primarily
interested in reasons for clustering and localized inter-
actions, the latter focus on conceptualizing and operationa-
lizing measures of network connectivity among cities.
There are presently several complementary modelling
approaches that consider networks of FABS firms and
multinational enterprises in the context of cities and clus-
ters. Taylor and Derudder (2016) use the interlocking
world city network model (IWCNM) based on office net-
works of FABS firms; Alderson and Beckfield (2004) con-
sider ownership ties within multinational enterprises; and
Pažitka, Wójcik, and Knight (2018) use inter-organiz-
ational projects. The GFNs framework developed by Coe
et al. (2014) and Wójcik (2018) is broader in scope and
considers the ties between FCs, offshore jurisdiction and
the rest of the world facilitated by FABS.
To understand the growth dynamics of financial services
firms, we must look beyond the locational advantages pro-
vided by clustering and consider their relational ties within
the financial sector. Financial markets are central to under-
standing relationality in investment banking and asset man-
agement, and the market can be thought of as the medium
through which many types of relational ties are formed
(Arjaliès et al., 2017; Clark & Monk, 2017). We will now
discuss in turn both the vertical and horizontal dimensions
of such networks formed by market interactions.
Investors and issuers, the two principal parties in capital
markets, are typically connected by complex chains of finan-
cial intermediaries, thus leading to a vertically differentiated,
but highly integrated, structure of financial services (Arjaliès
et al., 2017). These chains of financial intermediaries feature
investment banks as the central intermediaries responsible
for underwriting new issues of securities and allocating
them to investors, who are typically represented by asset
managers. Investment banks rely heavily on their reputa-
tional capital, which they develop over time by jointly satis-
fying the need of issuers to maximize proceeds raised from
the issuance of new securities and that of institutional inves-
tors, who compete on a risk-adjusted rate of return and rely
on favourable valuation of securities allocated to them by
investment banks (Clark & Monk, 2017; Dunbar, 2000).
To satisfy these competing objectives, investment banks
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have relied on their ability to reduce information asymme-
tries between investors and issuers by acting as reputable
intermediaries, who put their reputation at stake and guar-
antee a fair valuation of the securities they underwrite (Dun-
bar, 2000; Vithanage, Neupane, & Chung, 2016).
In addition to the vertical dimension of networks of
financial intermediaries, it is commonplace for financial
services firms also to form horizontal network ties. To opti-
mize their role as intermediaries between issuers and inves-
tors, investment banks form underwriting syndicates,
which allow them to pool their expertise, financial resources
and, perhaps most importantly, their reputational and net-
work capital. An underwriting syndicate can leverage its
ties to a wider pool of institutional investors than any indi-
vidual bank and deliver a superior service to the issuer by
reducing the costs of offering and maximizing proceeds
(Pichler & Wilhelm, 2001; Pollock et al., 2004). Securities
underwriters with high network centrality can leverage
their network both to disseminate information and to
extract information relevant to the pricing of new offerings
(Bajo, Chemmanur, Simonyan, & Tehranian, 2016). The
inclusion of reputable co-managers and commercial banks
in underwriting syndicates is documented to lead to
lower floatation costs and, consequently, higher net pro-
ceeds for issuers (Jeon & Ligon, 2011). This evidence is
corroborated by research on multiple lead underwriting
syndicates, which shows that by pooling their reputational
capital, investment banks can reduce informational asym-
metry between investors and issuers (Vithanage et al.,
2016). This leads to lower initial public offering (IPO)
under-pricing, lower variance of returns and superior
long-run returns for investors. Dunbar (2000) links these
factors to the variance in market share of investment
banks in IPO underwriting and corroborates the notion
that benefits, which underwriting syndicates offer issuers
and asset managers, in turn lead to higher market shares
of investment banks that convey them.
It is, however, not only the sheer number of network
ties that investment banks form that seems to affect the
benefits they derive from their network centrality. Burt
(2004) proposes that actors in social networks can serve
as brokers by spanning structural holes and thus connecting
otherwise disconnected actors within the network. Broker-
age function is hypothesized to benefit such actors by giv-
ing them a privileged access to information and resources
flowing through the network and may also give them a
form of network power, by intermediating ties among
others. In the context of investment banking syndication,
brokerage is linked to the ability of investment banks to
access deal flow and gain appointments in underwriting
syndicates. Consequently, banks with strategic positioning
within syndication networks that span structural holes are
shown to benefit from higher market shares in future (Shi-
pilov, 2006). Taken altogether, the universe of underwrit-
ing syndicates gives rise to syndication networks, which
evolve with every new underwriting syndicate.
Hypothesis 1. Firms with higher network centrality within syn-
dication networks grow faster and they benefit from both the
number of ties to other firms and the brokerage opportunities pro-
vided by their positioning in syndication networks.
Just as the benefits of syndication reaped by clients depend
on the characteristics of syndicate members, also the
benefits that individual banks obtain vary depending on
their roles in syndicates. Underwriting syndicates generally
feature lead-management and co-management appoint-
ments. Lead-managers, often also termed bookrunners
(securities issues) or mandated lead arrangers (syndicated
loans), are the key point of contact for clients, they under-
write a significant share of the securities issued or provide a
significant share of syndicated loans and earn the majority
of the fees. They also carry the primary legal and reputation
responsibility on the behalf of the syndicate. In contrast,
co-managers are generally engaged by lead-managers to
join the syndicate. Co-managers are assigned duties associ-
ated with the distribution of shares in securities offerings or
contribute money to a syndicated loan. Engaging in co-
management appointments allows lesser connected invest-
ment banks to develop relationships with issuers and
improve their chances of securing lead-management
appointments in future (Ljungqvist et al., 2009).
In contrast, only well-established and reputable banks can
reduce information asymmetry between issuers and investors
and in turn allow them to benefit from lower flotation costs,
reduced risk of offering and better long-run investment per-
formance (Bajo et al., 2016; Jeon & Ligon, 2011; Vithanage
et al., 2016). Consequently, for an underwriting syndicate to
deliver the benefits mentioned above, it needs to feature both
reputable banks and underwriters with appropriate expertise.
The former is necessary to reduce information asymmetry
and reassure investors that the offering is priced appropri-
ately, while the latter is needed to arrive at the appropriate
valuation in the first place (Pollock et al., 2004; Shipilov,
2006). Banks with established reputation and pre-existing
ties with issuers are typically selected as lead-managers of
securities offerings. It is, however, not feasible for every
bank to have in-house equity research analysts covering
every stock and this consequently creates opportunities for
lesser established investment banks to join underwriting syn-
dicates. In contrast to lead-managers, which typically serve
pre-existing clients, co-managers are often able to establish
new relationships with issuers, which may ultimately lead
to more lucrative lead-management appointments in the
future (Ljungqvist et al., 2009). Consequently, we would
expect that engaging in co-management appointments is
more likely to lead to the expansion of a bank’s clientele
and future growth than lead-management appointments,
which instead serve as a means of maintaining relationships
with existing clients and maximizing current revenue.
Hypothesis 2. Engaging in co-management appointments leads
to higher long-term growth, while lead-management appoint-
ments are of lesser benefit to future growth prospects in return
for higher current revenue.
In parallel to the developments in financial economics and
business studies, which treat networks as a non-spatial
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phenomenon, there has been a distinction made in the
economic geography literature between localized inter-
actions among co-located firms and long-distance network
ties connecting clusters (Bathelt, Malmberg, & Maskell,
2004). Clustering of financial services in the City of
London is often cited as a prime example that underlines
the relevance of both localized and long-distance inter-
actions and owes its success to its ability to concentrate
simultaneously key expertise and talent in space, allowing
it to deliver a wide variety of complex services to clients
worldwide (Clark, 2002, 2016).
Provided it is in fact the access to deal flow that motiv-
ates banks to design their networks strategically by span-
ning structural holes, as hypothesized by Shipilov (2006),
it is plausible that inter-cluster network ties could convey
benefits that intra-cluster ties do not. Examples of such
benefits include the following. First, financial services
firms located in different geographical areas are likely to
have smaller overlap in the client base and consequently
such network connections are more likely to lead to the for-
mation of relationships with new clients (Wójcik et al.,
2018a). Second, inter-cluster network ties may span struc-
tural holes and connect otherwise disconnected participants
in these networks (Burt, 2004). Third, inter-cluster net-
work ties may open access to new market segments and
allow financial services firms to benefit from the reputa-
tional capital and local expertise of their syndication part-
ners (Ljungqvist et al., 2009). Finally, access to a wider
pool of institutional investors also drives the formation of
underwriting syndicates (Pollock et al., 2004). Provided
there is a lesser overlap in the pools of institutional investors
that investment banks located in different FCs are con-
nected to, we expect that forming inter-cluster network
ties can lead to a bigger pool of institutional investors sub-
scribing to an offering. This, in turn, has implications for
the valuation of the offering, first-day returns and stock
price volatility (Vithanage et al., 2016).
Hypothesis 3. Inter-cluster network connections are more valu-
able than intra-cluster network connections with respect to a
firm’s long-term growth.
The final point relates to indirect effects of network central-
ity on co-located financial services firms within the same
FC. Participation in underwriting syndicates is linked
above to a multitude of outcomes that make financial ser-
vices firms more attractive to their clients and give them a
competitive advantage (Bajo et al., 2016; Jeon & Ligon,
2011; Shipilov, 2006; Vithanage et al., 2016). Conse-
quently,more central firms can outcompete lesser connected
firms for the same finite business opportunities. We expect
this competition effect to be stronger within FCs, despite
the fact that, at least in principle, financial services firms
can serve clients all over theworld. This is because a substan-
tial bias has been documented towards geographical proxi-
mity in financial services (Wójcik et al., 2018a). Financial
services firms also tend purposefully to co-locate with their
close competitors to monitor their activities and offer the
same degree of accessibility to their clients (Cook et al.,
2007). Co-located firms typically serve more overlapping
market segments in contrast to firms located in different
FCs and, as a direct result, financial services firms tend to
compete more directly with those firms located within
the same FC (Clark, 2002, 2016; Wójcik et al., 2018a;
Wójcik, Knight, O’Neill, & Pažitka, 2018b). Therefore,
we expect that an increase in the network centrality of a
focal firm would increase the competitive pressure on
other proximate firms and reduce their growth prospects,
ceteris paribus.
Hypothesis 4. Firms with central positioning in syndication net-
works outcompete other proximate financial services firms and
effectively grow at their expense, leading to a negative indirect
effect of network centrality on firm growth.
RESEARCH DESIGN
The related literature typically adopts a definition of clusters
based on market and non-market connections among co-
located firms, which rely on similar inputs, use similar tech-
nologies and knowledge, compete and cooperate, rather
than simply being spatial concentrations of firms from the
same industry (Porter, 2000). Consequently, standard
industrial classifications are not ideal for defining clusters
and can lead to serious omissions in sampling. We begin
with selecting two industry categories – commercial bank-
ing6 and investment banking and securities dealing,7
which are at the core of FCs – and sample companies with
total assets data available in at least one year in the period
2007–09 from the Bureau van Dijk’s FAME database.8
We restrict ourselves to those with a primary trading address
in England, Scotland orWales. This yields 2868 companies
with the required data available. We then search the Dealo-
gic databases9 for all advisors who have served UK clients as
underwriters of primary offerings of equity and debt securi-
ties, arrangers of syndicated loans, or advisors inmergers and
acquisitions (M&As). This leads to a combined sample of
3224 companies. In terms of industrial structure, commer-
cial banks (39%) and investment banks (33%) dominate
the sample. Other types of financial firms are also covered,
including consulting firms, based on their participation in
advisory roles for the four types of services considered
here. In terms of geographical location, the sample is heavily
weighted towards Inner London (47.5%) and Outer
London (9.8%) NUTS-2 regions. However, it also rep-
resents the rest of theUK,with 42.7%of sampled companies
located outside of the capital city (Figure 1).
We use a spatial econometric model with local spil-
lovers, presented in equations (1–3). Equation (1) is esti-
mated by the spatial Durbin error model (SDEM), and
equations (2) and (3) detail the structure of error term
(Anselin, 2013):
y = Xb1 +WXb2 + u (1)
u = lWu+ 1 (2)
1  N (0, s21IN ) (3)
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where y is the dependent variable; X is a vector of explana-
tory variables; β1 is a vector of direct effects; W is a spatial
weighting matrix; β2 is a vector of indirect effects; u is a
spatially correlated residual; ε is a normally distributed
residual with mean zero and constant variance; and λ is
the spatial error autocorrelation coefficient. The β1 coeffi-
cients can be interpreted as partial derivatives in the same
way as in non-spatial models, while the β2 coefficients are
interpreted as the cross-partial derivatives, meaning that
they are the average spatial spillovers falling on each neigh-
bour. This interpretation of β2 coefficients relies on the use
of binary symmetric adjacency matrix (W ) (Anselin, 2013).
While spatial econometric models of long-term growth
are common in studies of regions or countries, they are less
common in micro-economic studies (Anselin, 2013). Such
applications present their unique set of challenges, given
that W can no longer be meaningfully based on contiguity
















































Figure 1. Spatial distribution of the sampled financial services firms.
Note: Financial sector employment is the sum of full-time employment in financial services activities except insurance and pension
funding (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 2007 code 64) plus employment in activities auxiliary to financial services and
insurance activities (SIC 2007 code 66). Employment data were sourced from the Office for National Statistics’ (ONS) Business
Register and Employment Survey (BRES) database and are measured as of 2007. The number of sampled companies is pooled
across 2007–09 and is based on the availability of company total assets data from the Bureau van Dijk’s Financial Analysis
Made Easy (FAME) database. Regional boundaries are consistent with the NUTS-2 2010 classification.
Sources: Authors’ calculation based on FAME and BRES data.
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We consider several specifications of W based on varying
great circle distances in the range 30–70 km to show that
the results are reasonably robust to the size of the neigh-
bourhood selected. The specification of W does not allow
for firms to move their head office among cities; however,
it is robust to relocations within metropolitan areas set by
the great circle boundaries specified above. Given that
FABS firms seldom move their headquarters from one
city to another, we expect that this only has a marginal
effect on the results.
Figure A1 in Appendix A in the supplemental data
online provides a schematic illustration of the set-up used
for our econometric models. The explanatory variables
are measured at the beginning or before the growth period
modelled. The growth period represents an eight-year win-
dow, over which we calculate an average annual growth rate
of total assets. We also use shorter six-year windows for
robustness checks. The averaging of growth rates across
multiple annual periods is warranted, given that annual
firm growth rates are generally too volatile to model.
Therefore, we define the dependent variables as:
Gt1,t2 = ln (TAt2)− ln(TAt1)
t2− t1
where Gt1,t2 is the growth rate of total assets averaged
across a (t2 – t1) period; ln(TAt1) is the natural logarithm
of total assets at the beginning of the period; and
ln (TAt2) is the natural logarithm of total assets at the
end of the period.
The set of explanatory variables used in our models is
detailed in Table B1 and the descriptive statistics are in
Table B2 in Appendix B in the supplemental data online.
To control for clustering of both related and unrelated
activities, we construct two variables: the natural logarithm
of full-time employment in FABS and full-time employ-
ment in all other sectors at the NUTS-2 level. FABS
employment is defined as employment in financial services
activities except insurance and pension funding (Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) 2007 code 64) plus employ-
ment in activities auxiliary to financial services and insur-
ance activities (SIC 2007 code 66). Employment data
were sourced from the Office for National Statistics’
(ONS) Business Register and Employment Survey
(BRES) database. In studies of firm growth, there is typi-
cally a fraction of the sampled companies with missing
growth rates, because they have exited the sample during
the studied period. If exits are not random and are corre-
lated with explanatory variables in the growth equation,
this may result in biased coefficient estimates. To address
this problem, we use Heckman’s (1979) correction method
for dealing with selection bias in the sampling process.
We rely on the concept of the inter-organizational pro-
ject to operationalize our measures of network centrality.
Inter-organizational projects are defined as those involving
multiple financial services firms and delivered to a single
client, as a form of service provision (Pažitka et al.,
2018). We do not consider all possible inter-organizational
projects, but instead focus on underwriting syndicates of
equity and debt securities, syndicated loans and M&As
with multiple advisors. To construct measures of network
centrality of individual financial services firms, we use
affiliation matrices, which include data on syndicated
deals in these four categories and the respective syndicate
members for each deal. The affiliation matrices are popu-
lated with data for three years preceding the beginning of
measurement period for our dependent variable.
To address the network boundary specification pro-
blem, we do not restrict our networks to the UK, but
base the network centrality measures on a global network
of 7458 firms involved in the provision of these services.
This sample was obtained by sampling the top 500 book-
runner (ECM, DCM), mandated lead arrangers
(LOANS) and acquirer/target advisors (M&As) in each
year between 2000 and 2015. On a value-weighted basis,
this sample represents in excess of 99% of transactions in
these markets.
We consider multiple measures of network centrality
including degree centrality, betweenness and Burt’s
(2004) network constraint. We distinguish between
intra- and inter-cluster ties by dividing the degree centrality
measure into two separate variables based on the relative
positioning of financial services firms (Bathelt et al.,
2004). Additionally, we distinguish between network
ties formed by lead-management appointments10 and co-
management appointments11 (Ljungqvist et al., 2009).
This leads to a directed network, where ties are directed
from lead-managers to co-managers. Bathelt et al. (2004)
also propose that the value of long-distance network ties
is likely to be influenced by the size and importance of
the cluster that they connect the focal firm to. To account
for this, we include a specification of inter-cluster ties
weighted by the aggregate fees of the FC that these ties




The coefficient estimate on degree centrality (Table 1,
model [1]) implies that for every 10% increase in the num-
ber of unique ties with other firms, there is an estimated
0.24% increase in the average annual growth rate. We
then use betweenness centrality in model [2] to account
for brokerage opportunities offered by the focal firm’s posi-
tioning in the syndication network. The coefficient esti-
mate on betweenness centrality implies a 0.12% increase
in annual firm growth due to 10% increase in betweenness.
These estimates are of modest economic significance; how-
ever, this is likely due to the inability of these measures of
network centrality to account comprehensively for the posi-
tioning of firms in networks. In the context of financial ser-
vices, it has been argued that both the brokerage
opportunities and the sheer number of network ties are
important (Shipilov, 2006). We therefore also employ
Burt’s (2004) network constraint measure, which effectively
combines the previous two measures and varies with both
the number of connections and brokerage opportunities.
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Table 1. Main results.
Main equation [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
b̂ t-statistic b̂ t-statistic b̂ t-statistic b̂ t-statistic b̂ t-statistic b̂ t-statistic
Direct effects
Age 0.274*** 3.18 0.285*** 3.29 0.261*** 3.02 0.274*** 3.18 0.257*** 2.97 0.273*** 3.15
Age ^ 2 −0.033** –2.43 −0.035** –2.55 −0.031** −2.27 −0.033** −2.44 −0.030** −2.22 −0.032** −2.33
Total assets −0.041*** −6.28 −0.043*** −6.63 −0.043*** −6.69 −0.040*** −6.18 −0.044*** −6.98 −0.041*** −6.26
Total assets ^ 2 0.001** 2.50 0.001*** 2.99 0.001*** 2.93 0.001** 2.42 0.001*** 3.32 0.001*** 2.99
Degree centrality 0.025*** 4.86
Betweenness centrality 0.013*** 4.41
Network constraint −0.187*** −4.99
Degree centrality (intra-cluster ties) 0.000 −0.02
Degree centrality (inter-cluster ties) 0.030*** 3.19
Degree centrality (inter-cluster ties
weighted by FC size)
0.053*** 4.68
Degree centrality (co-management ties) 0.062*** 4.22
Degree centrality (lead-management ties) −0.034** −2.33
Survival probability −0.201** −2.11 −0.209** −2.19 −0.186* −1.95 −0.201** −2.11 −0.183* −1.91 −0.199** −2.08
FABS employment 0.039** 2.00 0.042** 2.13 0.039* 1.95 0.041** 2.03 0.043** 2.18 0.041** 2.06
Other employment −0.047 −0.99 −0.054 −1.13 −0.047 −0.99 −0.049 −1.04 −0.059 −1.24 −0.046 −0.96
Age*Total assets −0.001 −0.44 −0.001 −0.40 −0.001 −0.46 −0.001 −0.38 −0.001 −0.48 −0.002 −0.72
Indirect effects
Age −0.005 −0.20 −0.011 −0.39 −0.004 −0.16 −0.008 −0.28 −0.004 −0.15 −0.007 −0.27
Age ^ 2 0.001 0.16 0.001 0.27 0.001 0.16 0.001 0.21 0.000 0.09 0.001 0.34
Total assets 0.000 −0.12 0.000 −0.05 0.000 0.27 0.000 −0.25 0.001 0.55 −0.001 −0.35
Total assets ^ 2 0.000 0.28 0.000 −0.26 0.000 −0.22 0.000 0.21 0.000 −0.65 0.000 0.90
Degree centrality −0.004*** −2.60
Betweenness centrality −0.002** −2.14
Network constraint 0.024** 2.09
Degree centrality (intra-cluster ties) −0.001 −0.26



























Main equation [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
b̂ t-statistic b̂ t-statistic b̂ t-statistic b̂ t-statistic b̂ t-statistic b̂ t-statistic
Degree centrality (inter-cluster ties
weighted by FC size)
−0.007** −2.24
Degree centrality (co-management ties) −0.014*** −2.72
Degree centrality (lead-management ties) 0.000 0.00
Survival probability −0.010 −0.38 −0.004 −0.16 −0.012 −0.47 −0.008 −0.29 −0.010 −0.39 −0.007 −0.29
FABS employment 0.000 0.11 0.000 −0.07 0.000 0.13 0.000 0.09 −0.001 −0.65 0.000 −0.10
Other employment −0.002 −0.83 −0.002 −0.74 −0.002 −0.81 −0.002 −0.82 0.000 −0.12 −0.002 −0.89
Age*Total assets 0.000 0.58 0.001 0.88 0.000 0.50 0.000 0.71 0.000 0.72 0.000 0.17
Adjusted R2 0.192 0.185 0.189 0.186 0.189 0.192
Survival equation
Age 2.674*** 19.69
Total assets 0.195*** 9.33
Age* Total assets −0.107*** −7.73
Notes: The dependent variable for all main equations is an average annual growth rate of total assets for the period 2007–15 (G_TA_2007_2015). All variables, apart from survival probability, are transformed by taking a natural
logarithm and 1 is added to the value of variables that include zeros to avoid undefined values. All main equations are estimated by the spatial Durbin error model (SDEM). Survival equations are estimated by probit and are
identical across all models. Survival equations are estimated on the full sample (n ¼ 2830) and main equations are estimated on the sample of survivors – those firms that have data on total assets available for both the beginning
and the end of the period modelled (n ¼ 1246).
FABS, financial and business services; FC, financial centre.




















The estimate in model [3] implies a 1.99% increase in firm
growth per 10% decrease in network constraint.12 We
interpret the much larger estimated marginal effect of the
network constraint in contrast to either degree centrality
or betweenness as an evidence of the joint significance of
both the number of ties and the brokerage opportunities
presented by them and a likely interaction between the
two types of centralities with respect to the benefits they
offer.
To assess fully the economic significance of such
changes in network constraint, we must also consider the
frequency of large changes in network constraint that mate-
rially impact firm growth. We therefore examine the distri-
bution of annual percentage changes in network constraint.
We find that 4.3% of the observed annual changes rep-
resent 10% or higher reduction in network constraint.
We then zoom in on the non-zero annual changes only
and find that 31% of such changes are of 10% or higher
reduction, 24% of them exceed 20% reduction, 10% exceed
50% reduction, and 5% exceed 70% reduction in network
constraint. Similarly, increases in network constraint that
imply a deterioration of firm’s network centrality are not
uncommon. In fact, 57% of the non-zero annual changes
that we observe are positive and 36% represent a 10% or
higher increase in network constraint.
Hypothesis 2
Building on the work of Ljungqvist et al. (2009) on co-
management appointments, we make the distinction
between network ties formed by co-management and
lead-management appointments. The results indicate that
network ties formed through co-management appoint-
ments increase long-term firm growth by an estimated
0.59% per 10% increase in network centrality (Table 1,
model [5]). This finding is consistent with the results of
Ljungqvist et al., which suggest that despite the lower
fees and prestige associated with co-management appoint-
ments, they are a viable way of developing relationships
with new clients and increasing probability of obtaining
more lucrative lead-management appointments in future.
In contrast, lead-management appointments lead to an
estimated 0.33% reduction in firm growth per 10% increase
in network centrality. This is consistent with the estab-
lished knowledge that lead-management appointments
are typically assigned to firms that already have a well-
established relationship with the client and are, therefore,
unlikely to expand one’s client portfolio (Ljungqvist
et al., 2009). Such a reduction of future growth prospects
can be interpreted as an opportunity cost of higher current
revenue associated with lead-management appointments.
Hypothesis 3
We now consider the distinction between intra- and inter-
cluster network ties. The results shown in Table 1 (model
[4]) indicate that the value of network centrality with
respect to firm growth is primarily due to inter-cluster net-
work ties, which are estimated to increase firm growth by
0.28% per 10% increase in their frequency. This value is
very close to the 0.24% estimated for degree centrality,
which counts both inter- and intra-cluster ties. Combined
with the insignificant coefficient estimate on intra-cluster
ties, this evidence suggests that localized ties carry little
value for firm growth, while inter-cluster ties are the drivers
of firm growth. We also consider a different specification of
this variable and use weights based on the size of FC to
which inter-cluster ties connect the focal firm. The coeffi-
cient estimate on this specification of the inter-cluster ties
implies a 0.51% increase in firm growth for every 10%
increase in inter-cluster network ties (Table 2, model [5]).
Hypothesis 4
We now shift attention to the indirect effects of network
centrality on firm growth. This means that instead of
focusing on the focal firm, we consider the effect of changes
in the network centrality of the focal firm on the growth
rate of other co-located firms. The point estimates pre-
sented in Table 1 (model [3]) suggest that there is an esti-
mated 0.25% decrease in the average annual growth rate of
each firm within the proximity of a connected firm for a
10% decrease in its network constraint. Note that this is
not the cumulative effect across all neighbours as customa-
rily presented in studies using row-standardizedW, but the
average effect on each neighbouring firm. Therefore, par-
ticularly in big FCs with many well-connected firms and
even more small and lesser connected firms, such as
London, the resulting competitive pressures could become
a substantial impediment to the growth of lesser connected
and locally embedded firms.
Robustness checks
To verify the robustness of the results, we rerun the analysis
for three additional time periods.13 We do this because the
beginning of the sample period is at the eve of the global
financial crisis, which was a very turbulent period for the
financial sector. Financial services firms have employed a
variety of responses, including deleveraging, moving into
new markets and laying off a part of their workforce (Wój-
cik & MacDonald-Korth, 2015). For this reason, it is
plausible that some of the factors not controlled for could
be affecting the results and leading to omitted variable
bias. Provided that these factors are specific to the global
financial crisis period, we should see material changes in
the results for different time periods. The results show a
great degree of persistence and the partial effect of network
constraint based on the coefficient estimate for the period
2007–15 is a 1.99% increase in firm growth per 10%
decrease in network constraint. This increases to 2.01%
for the period 2007–13, 2.13% for the period 2008–15
and decreases to 1.98% for the period 2009–15 (see
Table C1 in Appendix C in the supplemental data online).
Spatial econometrics has been criticized, although the
jury is still out on whether rightfully, for the dependence
of coefficient estimates on the structure of spatial weighting
matrices (Anselin, 2013). In order to make sure that the
results are not driven by our specification of great circle dis-
tance, we consider other plausible values ranging from 30 to
70 km to construct spatial weighting matrices. The results
presented in Table C2 in Appendix C in the supplemental
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data online show only minimal variation in the estimated
direct partial effects on the network constraint variable.
Estimated partial effects of network constraint range
between 1.82% (40 km) and 2.05% (70 km) increase in
firm growth rate for a 10% decrease in network constraint.
As expected, the variation in the indirect effects of network
constraint is slightly higher and they range between a
0.23% (70 km) and a 0.45% (40 km) reduction in the aver-
age annual growth rate of every co-located firm as a result of
a 10% decrease in network constraint of the focal firm.
CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this paper has been to study the effect of
network centrality of financial services firms within syndi-
cation networks on their long-term growth rate and the
indirect effects on other co-located firms. The study is
not the first to consider the effect of network centrality
on firm growth or that of clustering (Frenken et al.,
2015; Shipilov, 2006). Instead, its main contribution is in
bridging the gap between these related, yet separately evol-
ving, strands of literature and developing a research design
that allows for modelling the relationship between network
centrality and firm growth, while accounting for clustering
and localized interactions among firms. The results speak
to both groups of literature and explicitly consider financial
services firms, which have been under-researched in studies
of firm growth (Frenken et al., 2015; Macpherson & Holt,
2007).
The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that
network centrality increases firm growth; however, we
also find substantial differences in the contribution of
different types of network ties. We find that accounting
for both the frequency of ties and the brokerage opportu-
nities presented by a firm’s positioning in syndication net-
works better accounts for the effect of network centrality
than either specification separately. In contrast to Shipilov
(2006), we explicitly consider financial services firms as
being part of FCs and account for potential localization
and urbanization economies to isolate the effect of network
centrality at the firm level and to consider its wider signifi-
cance for FCs. This part of the present analysis extends
related studies of localized inter-firm interactions within
FCs (Clark, 2002; Cook et al., 2007). This study also
fills gaps in the research on the world-city network (Taylor
& Derudder, 2016) and GFNs (Coe et al., 2014; Wójcik,
2018) by providing empirical evidence linking the position-
ing of financial services firms within syndication networks
to their long-term growth and studying the indirect effects
of network centrality diffusing to other firms within their
FCs.
We also consider the distinction between different types
of network ties. Bathelt et al. (2004) predict that network
ties connecting clusters should enhance the competitiveness
and growth of clusters, an effect enhanced by network con-
nectivity within clusters and limited by the absorptive
capacity of firms.We find that the connected firms generally
benefit from forming inter-cluster network ties and this
effect varies with the size of the FCs to which they are
connected. On the other hand, the observed indirect effects
are overwhelmingly negative and can be interpreted as a
growth of connected firms at the expense of others in their
proximity, as the result of localized competition.
The next distinction is made between network ties
formed through lead-management and co-management
appointments. This part of the analysis draws on the
work of Ljungqvist et al. (2009), who argue that co-man-
agement appointments can serve as stepping stones for
financial services firms to develop relationships with new
clients. This may ultimately lead to more lucrative lead-
management appointments in future. We uncover the
fact that it is co-management appointments that drive
future growth, while lead-management appointments
restrict future growth opportunities in exchange for
immediate revenue. This evidence is consistent with the
proposition of Ljungqvist et al. (2009) that co-manage-
ment appointments serve to expand the portfolios of clients
of investment banks, while lead-management appoint-
ments are typically assigned to banks with whom the client
already has an established relationship.
With regard to methodology, we extend the work of
studies of financial services firms and clustering by control-
ling for firm heterogeneity and by allowing for econometric
modelling of indirect effects of explanatory variables on co-
located firms, which allows one to identify different sources
of inter-firm indirect effects (Beaudry& Swann, 2009; Pan-
dit et al., 2001). Although the methods used here are not
new, their unique combination and application in this con-
text breaks new ground and will hopefully inspire future
research onFCs based on amicro-economic level of analysis.
The results underline the value of researching economic–
geographical phenomena at the firm level, given that simply
looking at clusters or regions can often overlook important
heterogeneity observable only at the firm level.
There are several implications of our findings for public
policy and corporate strategy. The results on the divergence
of growth rates between well-connected and lesser con-
nected firms imply that financial services will become
more concentrated at the firm level over time, in the
absence of any countervailing forces. Consequently, this
mechanism has the potential to exacerbate the too-big-
to-fail problem, particularly if larger firms are more likely
to develop central positioning within GFNs to begin with.
The inherent uncertainties regarding the terms of the
UK’s future relationship with the European Union following
Brexit raise the following question.What is the likely impact
of Brexit on the UK’s financial sector? London, as a global
FC, not only derives nearly 30% of its revenue14 from clients
based in other European Union member states, but also it
serves as a gateway FC for foreign banks wishing to access
European financial markets. Consequently, ties with the
rest of the European Union are relevant both to London’s
ability to serve a significant share of its clientele as well as
to attract subsidiaries of foreign banks, which contributed
45% of fees earned by London-based firms in 2015 (Wójcik
et al., 2018b). Therefore, we expect that depending on the
severity of barriers posed by the final Brexit agreement, at
least part of the revenue earned from both European
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Union clients and subsidiaries of foreign banks located in the
UK may be in jeopardy.
European FCs are presently, of course, not the only
places that London-based firms are connected to within
GFNs. The New York–London axis is quoted as the
most significant tie in GFNs, and London is also con-
nected to all other major FCs in the world, including
Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore, Sydney, Toronto, Chicago
and many others (Wójcik et al., 2018b). The question,
therefore, remains whether London could refocus its activi-
ties and networks towards the rest of the world following
Brexit. Alternatively, London’s ties to other FCs could suf-
fer as a result of Brexit if it compromises its function as a
gateway to European capital markets. In such an event, it
is plausible that the damage caused by Brexit could in
fact spread through London’s financial networks, rather
than be absorbed by them. As a worst-case scenario,
London could end up being circumvented within GFNs
and a new gateway city for foreign banks wishing to access
European financial markets could emerge.
This paper is restricted to England, Scotland and
Wales, and although the focus is on long-term firm growth,
we use at most eight years of data. With better data avail-
ability in future, this research can hopefully be extended to
cover longer periods and more countries. More work needs
to be done to identify the specific mechanism behind what
is identified as the effect of localized competition between
firms with high network centrality and their lesser con-
nected counterparts. We hope that future research will
build on this contribution.
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NOTES
1. Wójcik and MacDonald-Korth (2015) show a decline
of 8% (88,000 jobs) in UK financial services employment
between 2008 and 2012 using ONS BRES data.
2. The average and median total assets growth rates of the
sampled companies between 2007 and 2015 are both
negative.
3. Findings of Wójcik, Knight, and Pažitka (2018) indi-
cate that the global investment banking fees in 2015 were
60.52% of their 2007 value.
4. Syndication networks are formed by co-membership of
financial services firms in equity and debt securities under-
writing syndicates, syndicated loans or M&As.
5. Equity capital market (ECM), debt capital market
(DCM), syndicated loans (LOANS) and M&As.
6. North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS) 2012 – 522110.
7. NAICS 523110.
8. The FAME database covers both publicly listed and
private firms located in the UK and Northern Ireland.
9. ECM, DCM, LOANS and M&As.
10. ECM – bookrunner; DCM – bookrunner; LOANS –
mandated lead arranger; M&As – acquirer/target advisor.
11. Non-lead-managers, co-managers and underwriters.
12. A decrease in network constraint means that either
the number of network ties has increased or the brokerage
opportunities offered by a firm’s positioning within a net-
work have improved.
13. The periods 2007–13, 2008–14 and 2009–15.
14. This relates to revenue from securities underwriting,
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